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The present Work Project discusses the answer from Deloitte to a proposal raised by the European 
Commission on Mergers and acquisitions and its impact on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. A 
theoretical approach on the subject was performed through a literature review and the foundation of a 
statistical approach was laid by developing a methodology for the study as well as defining statistical 
parameters suited for the research.  
Objectives for the organisation 
In September 2017, I joined Deloitte Belgium as an intern in the financial advisory department.   I was 
mainly working inside the valuation team inside the corporate finance business unit. During my time in the 
company, I was supervised by Stijn de Nijs, manager inside the valuation team. Throughout my first months 
in the company, I was mainly involved in answering a request for Proposal demanded by the European 
commission and working on different smaller projects involving calculation of Wacc’s or valuation of 
companies. The title of the proposal was “The Study on the Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on 
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Sector”.  In order to answer the RFP from the EC, I was assigned to a 
team composed of members from Deloitte Monitor1  and Deloitte consulting London.  
Mergers and Acquisitions of a certain size, which potentially affect members of the European Union must 
be approved by the European commission under the Council Regulation.2 The examination of proposed 
mergers by the European commission (EC) aims to inhibit harmful effects on competition and price in order 
to protect consumer interests. The merger review by the EC is prospective in nature and ambitions to prevent 
mergers that would reduce competition in the industry and would deprive customers with the benefits of 
the competition.  
                                                          
1 Deloitte Monitor is the Monitor Deloitte is the multinational strategy consulting practice of Deloitte Consulting. 
Monitor Deloitte specializes in providing strategy consultation services to the senior management of major 
organizations and governments.  
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:en:PDF   
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A few studies already have examined how M&A activity could have an impact on innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The objective of this study for the EC is to complement previous studies on the 
subject by using new innovation indicators relating the impact of M&A through a statistical analysis by 
answering the following research question (RQ): 
RQ: What statistical parameters can be used as indicators to measure innovation inside 
pharmaceutical companies?  
The aim of the research is first to analyse the impact of M&A on innovation in general terms as previous 
studies have already covered but also specifically on medicinal product development and launch. Secondly, 
an analysis should be conducted of how particular mergers in the pharmaceutical sector have had an impact 
on innovation and medicinal product development. This analysis should be conducted through different 
illustrations of case studies on specific mergers aiming to provide validations to the former statistical 
analysis.3  
Scope of the study  
 
The study is directed towards M&A deals with European relevance (at least one M&A entity 
commercialising medicinal products in the EEA) and or having R&D capabilities worldwide aiming to 
launch medicinal products in the EEA4. 
The pharmaceutical companies present in the sample must verify the following conditions: 
- The manufacturer of pharmaceutical products must be innovative in nature, generic medicinal 
products manufacturers should be excluded from the sample 
                                                          
3 European Commission. (2017). CALL FOR TENDERS: Study on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Retrieved from https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-questions.html;eTenderingPublic=IZ-
3A4TZ9TOL_ywDtIvt7azA3uDR29kWHq0kos83vwMOgWevt-eX!-1127343784?cftId=2798 
4 EEA stands for European Economic Area. Created in 1994, the EEA combines countries of the EU and member countries of 
EFTA and is composed of Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia,Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,  
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- The company must produce prescription medicinal products (over the counter products must be 
excluded) 
- Transactions between the companies must have taken place between 2010 and 2013 
- Transactions must have a deal value above 50 million euro  
- The sample must have a minimum size of 100 companies.  
Analysis methodology 
For the elaboration of our tender to the proposal, one of my task was to compile a list of relevant statistical 
parameters that could be of interest for the study. Studying the impact of M&A on innovation, it important 
to identify the right indicators that M&A deals would influence the most. In order to gather that list, my 
first idea was to separate each potential indicator according to those tree categories of variables: 
- R&D resource indicators 
- Pipeline progress indicators 
- Market and financial performance indicators 
After having established this list, first I had to explain the rationale behind the inclusion of each potential 
statistical variable. Secondly, I had to find the potential sources for extracting those statistical indicators by 
researching in the different databases if it was possible to extract relevant data able to express those 
parameters.  
Finally, I organized the indicators according to four categories by including an additional group covering 
M&A deal specific indicators. This additional group was included since variables explaining the rationale 
of the form of the deal should also have a substantial impact on innovation. For example, the relative size 
of the deal premium paid by the acquirer could be a significant indicator for spurring innovation inside the 
new entity since a company might be willing to pay more for a target where they believe they can achieve 
synergies, ultimately leading to innovation.   
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Table 1: Examples of R&D resource indicators 
R&D resource indicators Rationale Source 
R&D spending Definition: R&D spending is the annual 
amount (expressed in $ million) a firm 
devotes to research and development. 
R&D spending should have a direct 
impact on innovation.  
Rationale: Since innovation is the output 
of R&D a measure of R&D expenditure 
will likely have a positive effect on 
innovation 
Bloomberg, Annual reports, EU R&D 
Scoreboard 
R&D intensity Definition: R&D intensity is total R&D 
expenditure divided by total revenue  
Rationale: In general, R&D is seen as a 
main driver of societal and business 
innovation. Hence, measuring R&D 
intensity would have a positive 
relationship with innovation.  






Table 2: Examples of pipeline progress indicators 
Pipeline progress indicators Rationale Source 
Number of medicinal products 
in various clinical development phases 
Definition: The sum of all 
chemical/biological entities in the 
different development phases of the 
R&D process.  
 
Rationale: An increase in the number of 
medicinal products in the various clinical 
development phases after an M&A 
activity would indicate that the company 
is bringing more products into 
development and hence has a positive 
impact on innovation.  
Annual reports 
Other sources from the grey literature 
will also be considered. 
Number of discontinued Programs in 
view of related clinical trial results 
Definition: The number of programs that 
are stopped because of unsuccessful 
results during clinical trials.  
 
Rationale: there might be a negative 
relationship between the number of 
discontinued programs and innovation. 
A high number of discontinued programs 
can represent a lack of resources and 
lead to a lack of innovation 
Annual reports 
Other sources from the grey literature 
will also be considered. 
Number of compounds in the  
preclinical stage / discovery phase (Stage 
0/I) 
Definition: The amount of compounds 
that a company has in stage 0 or 1 of 
research. 
 
Rationale: An increase in the number of 
compounds in the preclinical stage 
would be beneficial because it shows an 
inflow of newly developed compounds 
Annual reports 
Other sources from the grey literature 
will also be considered. 
Number of compounds in 
Stage II 
Definition: total amount of 
chemical/biological entities that are in 
stage II of development 
 
Rationale: An increase in the number of 
compounds in the preclinical stage 
would be beneficial because it shows an 
inflow of newly developed compounds 
graduating from stage I 
Annual reports 
Other sources from the grey literature 
will also be considered. 
Number of compounds in  
Stage III  
Definition: total amount of 
chemical/biological entities that are in 
stage III of development 
 
Rationale: An increase in the number of 
compounds in the preclinical stage 
would be beneficial because it shows an 
inflow of newly developed compounds 
graduating from stage II 
Annual reports 
Other sources from the grey literature 
will also be considered. 
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Progress in pipelines Definition: Total amount of molecules 
that progressed one stage including new 
entrants in the pre-clinical stage (stage 0) 
 
Rationale: When compounds move 
through the different stages, it means 
that the chance of it resulting in a real 
treatment rises. A higher number 
represents more innovation. 
Annual reports 
Other sources from the grey literature 
will also be considered. 
 
 
Table 3: Examples of market and financial performance indicators 
Financial performance indicators Rationale Source 
EBITDA Definition: EBITDA is all earnings a 
company receives before taxes over a 
year. 
 
Rationale: EBITDA can be a proxy for 
firm size. Firms with large revenues will 
likely be more prepared for M&A 
activity. 
Bloomberg 
Other sources will also be considered as 
Bloomberg is set for quoted companies. 
Solvency ratio Definition: solvency ratio measures the 
ability of a company to meet its long 
term debts. Calculated as followed: 
 




Rationale: This ratio can be used as a 
proxy of the financial health of a 
company. Firms with high solvency ratio 
are more likely to have a positive impact 
on innovation. While firms with low 
solvency ratio, which can indicate a high 
level of leverage are more likely to 
decrease their R&D intensity 
substantially (Hall, (1990)5.  
Bloomberg 
Other sources will also be considered as 
Bloomberg is set for quoted companies. 
Quick Ratio Definition: it is the liquidity ratio of a 
company and is calculated as: 
 




Rationale: Quick ratio has a positive 
influence on R&D investment. Indeed, if 
a company faces a financial risk, it will 
be more passive in R&D investment due 
to its financial difficulties (Lee & Choi, 
Bloomberg 
Other sources will also be considered as 
Bloomberg is set for quoted companies. 
                                                          
5 Hall, B. (1999): Mergers and R&D revisited, mimeo 
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2015)6. Therefore, quick ratio can have a 
substantial influence on R&D and 
innovation.  
Number of employees Definition: Number of person currently 
employed by the company.  
 
Rationale: The number of employees can 
be used as proxy for firm size. Firm size 
can have a substantial impact on 
innovation as large firms have more 
knowledge available that fuels 
innovation. 
Global data 
EU R&D Scoreboard 
Other 
Market capitalization Definition: Market capitalization is the 
market perception of the full value of the 
company.  
 
Rationale: It is the most simplified way 
to calculate a company's size and value. 
Where a higher value means that 
investors are expecting higher revenues 
in the future and likely also more 
innovation.  
Bloomberg 
Other sources will also be considered as 
Bloomberg is set for quoted companies. 
DEBT/ Asset Definition: The debt to total assets ratio 
is an indicator of financial leverage. The 
debt to total assets ratio is calculated by 
dividing a corporation's total liabilities 
by its total assets. 
 
Rationale: Financial leverage should 
have an impact on innovation and R&D 
investment as companies are more likely 
to look to finance themselves through 
equity because of its more relaxing 
financial constraints  (Chang & Song, 
(2014). 7 
Bloomberg 
Other sources will also be considered as 
Bloomberg is set for quoted companies. 
Number of therapeutic areas the firm is 
active in 
Definition: The number of therapeutic 
areas a company invests in.  
 
Rationale: A high number of therapeutic 
areas in which a firm invests might have 
an impact on the R&D output as a firm 
specializing in a specific therapeutic area 
might have a competitive advantage in 
that area and  
Company reports 
Tobin’s q Definition: the inverse of the Market to 




Other sources will also be considered as 
Bloomberg is set for quoted companies. 
                                                          
6 Lee, M., & Choi, M. (2015). The Determinants of Research and Development Investment in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Focus 
on Financial Structures. Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives, 6(5), 302-309. doi:10.1016/j.phrp.2015.10.013 




Rationale: Tobins q measures the market 
value compared to the book value, this 
means it is highly sensitive to changes in 
expected future cash flows that could 
indicate future patent expiry. 
 
Table 4: Examples of M&A indicators 
M&A indicators Rationale Source 
Deal size in mn Definition: The size of the transaction 
(Enterprise value) in $ million.  
 
Rationale: Larger deals can have bigger 
consequences for innovation since firms 
would likely find it more rewarding to 
invest in more innovative firms.  
Mergermarket 
Global Data 
Relative deal size: enterprise value 
expressed as multiples of EBITDA, 
EBIT and revenue  
Definition: Deal size divided by 
EBITDA, EBIT and Revenue 
 
Rationale: this will allow expressing the 
relative price paid for various companies 
cotrolling for their size 
Mergermarket 
Deal type Definition: The deal can be classified 
under Joint Venture, Acquisition, 
Merger, Strategic alliance, divestment or 
licensing. 
 
Rationale: The type of deal can have a 
substantial impact on innovation as in a 
strategic alliance synergies may realise 
faster than in a proper merger. 
Mergermarket 
Global Data 
Deal geography Definition: Whether the merger is 
between two companies from different 
countries or from the same market. 
 
Rationale: Deal geography might have 
an impact on innovation as a cross 
boarder deal might be pursued to have 
access to a new market or knowledge, at 
the same time cross border deals might 
bring additional managerial problems 
that could hamper innovation. 
Mergermarket 
Global Data 
Premium paid Definition: The excess value the acquirer 
pays to the owners of the company 
compared to the current market value. 
 
Rationale: Since firms are willing to pay 
more for more innovative companies, if 
the premium is very high the acquirer 







In order to answer the research question and estimate what statistical parameters can be used as indicators 
to measure innovation inside pharmaceutical companies, a multiple linear regression model was built. The 
model is explained in the results sections of this paper. In conjunction with the model, statistical tests were 
performed aiming to analyse the different independent variables.    
In addition to the statistical analysis, the proposal requires an in depth analyse of at least four mergers in 
the pharmaceutical sector in order to illustrate the effect of M&A on innovation for relevant companies. 
This case study approach enables to differentiate the impact from M&A from other factors that could 
influence innovation. Those case studies would serve as a validation of the results from the statistical 
analysis.  
For the elaboration of the proposal, I was asked to research, analyse and select four cases studies that could 
be of interest.  After the selection, I had to make a summary of the cases by explaining the motives of the 
companies involved behind the merger, raising the competition concerns and explain why the cases are of 
interest for the proposal. In the proposed solution for the organisation based on the literature review section 
of this research, you can find a summary of the different case studies that were selected. 
Literature review 
The pharmaceutical business model relies on innovation. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies have a 
business model that relies on a steady stream of new products reaching the market, making innovation of 
the utmost importance. According to Deloitte’s annual ‘Measuring the Return from Pharmaceutical 
Innovation’ report8, since 2010 the 12 top pharmaceutical companies (defined by spend on research and 
development) have launched 233 products with projected total revenues of $1,538 billion. Over the same 
                                                          





period the R&D divisions of these companies have progressed 376 assets into late-stage pipelines with total 
forecast sales of $1,697 billon.   
Figure 1: Attrition rate per clinical trial phase 
9 
However, almost every year, we have seen declining returns on company investment in innovation10. In the 
latest report, projected returns are at their lowest at 3.7 percent, compared to the original high of 10.2 percent 
in 2010. While the total number of pipeline assets has remained relatively constant the value of these assets 
has declined significantly. This has led to a situation in which there are blockbuster costs without balancing 
blockbuster revenues – average peak sales per asset has declined from $816 million in 2010 to $394 million 
in 2016. 
It is well documented that changes in the way the pharmaceutical industry operates are likely behind this 
trend1. Regulatory, health system and political environments are all exerting unprecedented pressures on 
companies as is the increasingly specialized nature of drug discovery and development. 
The Deloitte ‘R&D leaders’ report11  confirms that key drivers influencing life science R&D priorities are: 
                                                          
9 Thomas, D. W., Burns, J., Audette, J., Carroll, A., Dow-Hygelund, C., & Hay, M. (2016). Clinical Development Success Rates 
2006-2015. Retrieved from Biotechnology Innovation Organization website: 
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/Clinical%20Development%20Success%20Rates%202006-2015%20-
%20BIO,%20Biomedtracker,%20Amplion%202016.pdf 
10 Taylor K, Stockbridge M, Shah S. (2016). Balancing the R&D equation: measuring the return from pharmaeutical innovation. 
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-
innovation.html. 




 Rapid shifts in regulatory and payer environments  
 The generation of new insight derived from Real World Evidence (RWE) 
 Pressures to reduce time to market 
 Ongoing re-evaluation of the portfolio composition in light of competitor activities and therapeutic 
advances. 
Externalization strategies are also being adopted to respond to market challenges. Indeed, R&D leaders are 
turning to externalization strategies when responding to market challenges and innovation competition. 
There is a strong belief that looking externally will help gain access to talent and cutting edge technologies, 
consolidate in specific therapy areas and improve development success rates. Leaders are particularly 
interested in non-horizontal deals in e.g. digital, IT and data analysis to develop devices or applications to 
collect patient data and enable data management and analysis. Clinical partnerships for designing and 
conducting clinical trials also remain a high priority. 
This trend is particularly true when considering early stage innovation – discovery and phase 1 development 
– where activity is increasingly moving towards a network of smaller, highly specialized start-up & 
academic organizations, and away from big pharma. 
“we are changing to become more extroverted in early stage research while development will become more 
introverted by harnessing internal knowledge to use as a competitive edge and to become less dependent 
on CROs who have little to loose from failing” – Chief Scientific Officer 
However, M&A is just one element of an externalization strategy. Hence, executing an externalization 
strategy is not limited to M&A. Joint ventures and collaborations are increasingly common alternatives. 
The popularity of M&A has declined in recent years, perhaps due to the often inflated prices of potential 
targets. According to Deloitte’s annual M&A index12, which tracked $3.2 trillion worth of M&A activity 
in 2016 across multiple sectors and geographies; pharmaceutical M&A volume remains strong but the 
                                                          





values showed a sharp decline in 2016 – totaling $75 billion, down from $200 billion in 2015; only three 
so called ‘mega deals’ were announced in 2016, compared to eight in 2015. 
A similar trend can be observed when considering the origin of late stage pipeline value in Deloitte R&D 
report. Since 2013, there has been a steady decrease in the proportion of projected late-stage pipeline 
revenue derived from externally sourced assets, a trend that accelerated in 2016 as the last of the assets 
acquired as part of large-scale M&A in the late 2000s launch. 
Therefore, it will become increasingly important to understand the impact of M&A on innovation.  
We believe that big pharma companies will increasingly look to M&A to replenish pipelines and make up 
for their inability to foster internal innovation. Indeed, this may have already become a reality in Europe 
which in Deloitte’s ’M&A index’ report3 was the only region that saw an uptick in pharma M&A deals in 
2016 vs. 2015 – with France being the most active target country.  
Consequently, it is timely to gain a better understanding of the extent M&A impacts the broader innovation 
environment to ensure patients and society continue to benefit from advances in medicine.  
The relationship between M&A and innovation is complex. Deloitte has explored elements of this already 
as it relates to individual pharmaceutical companies. For example, data from its annual R&D report suggests 
that, compared to big pharma, mid-tier pharmaceutical companies have a greater proportion of late stage 
pipeline value sourced via acquisitions and are more likely to have a higher rate of return on their investment 
into innovation.  
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Figure 2: Share of revenue derived from acquired assets
  
13 
However, a broader analysis by Deloitte contrasting 1,621 licensing deals, 69 M&A deals and 9 joint 
ventures between 2007-12 found that on a per asset level, M&A deals were associated with a lower 
probability of launch (12%  vs. 22% for licensing and 56% for joint ventures) suggesting there are many 
different factors at play. 
A relatively large body of academic literature has attempted to explore the relationship between M&A and 
innovation14. From a business perspective, M&A are often considered to be attractive as they remove 
duplication, reduce costs and produce synergies resulting in economies of scale/scope or other financial 
gains15. Examples of this include the sharing of duplicated departments like marketing and human resources 
to profit from economies of scale, the merging of a sales force to benefit from the economies of scope and 
the recently failed Pfizer/Allergan merger where tax gains were possible. Another financial reason to pursue 
a merger is to fill the pipeline with more products, providing the firm with more certainty on sustainable 
                                                          
13Taylor K, Stockbridge M, Shah S. (2016). Balancing the R&D equation: measuring the return from pharmaeutical innovation. 
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-
innovation.html. 
14 Schulz, N. (2007). Review on the literature of mergers on innovation. 
15 Mittra, J. (2007). Life science innovation and the restructuring of the pharmaceutical industry: Merger, acquisition and 
strategic alliance behaviour of large firms. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 19(3), 279-301. 
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revenue generation in the future. These deals also include mergers where the firm substantially deviates 
from their specialization, bringing them into new treatment areas.  
LaMattina (2011)16 presented how early-stage R&D could be slowed as a result of M&A given the time 
some fundamental processes may take to align, such as IT platforms, data handling or adverse event 
monitoring systems. Industry consolidation is argued also to have resulted in less competition and less 
investment in R&D.  
Bronwyn Hall (1988)17 finds that there is no difference in pre- and post-M&A R&D performance in firms 
who are involved in merger. However, for firms with the highest propensity to merge, those that did merge 
experienced more rapid post-M&A growth that those that did not merge. Martynova et al. (2006) suggested 
that the acquirer’s leverage prior to takeover seems to have no impact on the post-M&A performance of 
the combined firm18,19. They also concluded that acquisitions of relatively large targets result in better 
profitability of the combined firm subsequent to the takeover, whereas acquisitions of a small target lead to 
a profitability decline.  
Danzon et al. (2007)20 analyzed the post-M&A performance of the pharmaceutical industry on the firm 
level for the period 1988-2000. They splitted the sample into large and small firms; and first estimated 
propensity scores for being involved in a merger. They found that large firm mergers are connected to 
expiring drug patents, while small firms’ propensity to be involved in a merger (target) is connected to 
financial distress. The impact of mergers on R&D was only one of their performance indicators. R&D was 
measured as R&D investments. Controlling for the propensity score large firms that merged did not show 
significantly different R&D activities up to 3 years after the merger compared to firms that did not merge. 
                                                          
16 LaMattina, J. L. (2011). The impact of mergers on pharmaceutical R&D. Nature reviews. Drug discovery, 10(8), 559. 
17 Hall, B. H. (1988). The effect of takeover activity on corporate research and development. In Corporate takeovers: Causes and 
consequences (pp. 69-100). University of Chicago Press. 
18 Martynova, M., Oosting, S., & Renneboog, L. (2006). The long-term operating performance of European mergers and 
acquisitions. 
19 Tjandrawinata, R. R., & Simanjuntak, D. G. (2012). The impact of mergers and acquisitions in research-based pharmaceutical 
companies on productivity. 
20 Danzon, P. M., Epstein, A., & Nicholson, S. (2007). Mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(4‐5), 307-328. 
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In general small firms exhibited lower R&D investment growth if they merged. Only small firms with a 
very high propensity score witnessed a higher R&D activity.  
Frey and Hussinger (2006)21 concentrated on the probability of being a merger target depending on the 
innovative performance of the firm. Hence, here it was not the impact of a merger on innovation, but on the 
contrary the impact of innovative performance on being involved in a merger as a target. They found that 
the stock of patents has a negative impact on this probability and cross-border dummy has also a negative 
impact, but the interaction term of the technical proximity (closeness of patent portfolios) with the cross-
border dummy triggers a positive impact, while the same interaction term for domestic mergers does not. 
As some firms engage in innovation in order to be acquired the causality of this relationship, however, is 
not clear.  
Overall, drawing conclusions with certainty is a challenge because current research tends to: 
 Consider narrow / crude innovation measures (e.g. R&D spending, where more targeted spending may 
be more beneficial than higher total spending) 
 Focus on measuring innovation over a relatively short time period, which may not be reflective of the 
drug development timelines. 
 Lack sufficient exploration of the many different nuances that could influence an innovation outcome 
e.g. M&A sub-groups, reason for M&A, post-M&A integration approach etc. 
It will be important to consider a range of different innovation types and innovation outcomes when 
measuring the impact of M&A.  
In addition, there is a need to segment M&A events to fully understand how different types of M&A can 
effect innovation. 
                                                          
21 Frey, R., & Hussinger, K. (2006). The role of technology in M&As: a firm-level comparison of cross-border and domestic 
deals (No. 2006, 45). Discussion paper Series 1/Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank. 
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Proposed Solution for the organisation based on the literature review 
Data  
For the empirical analysis, several data sources have been used. Data on the deals were collected from the 
website MergerMarket (https://www.mergermarket.com/homepage?). The website provides a global 
library of public and private historical M&A transactions including fully sourced financials for the entire 
dataset.  
The data was collected using search function of the website by narrowing our sample of transactions based 
on the following characteristics:  
- European deals: at least one of the acquirer or the target must be active in Europe  
- The transaction must have been completed between 01/01/2010 and 31/12/2013 
- Deals  of at least €50 Million  
- Both acquiring and target companies must be primarily active in the Pharmaceutical sector and 
have activities in the development of  new medicinal products 
- The acquiring companies must be publicly traded on stock market 
- The acquiring company must still be active and have not been acquired by another company after 
M&A event.  
Based on that research and on availability of data, our treatment group consists of 46 public transactions 
having occurred between the 14th of January 2010 and the 9th of January 2014. The sample consists of 32 
different acquiring companies that are currently active.  
The research mainly relies on quantitative and secondary data, as for the 32 acquiring companies; annual 
data on different indicators was downloaded from a secondary source; Bloomberg. Annual figures about 
revenue, EBITDA, R&D expenditures and the number of employees for each of the 32 companies were 
extracted in USD from the database from 2010 until 2017.  In order to perform the regression analysis on 
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which we will elaborate in the results sections, more variables specific to the acquirer’s financials such as 
Tobin’s Q ratio, Total Debt to Total assets and market capitalization; were downloaded from Bloomberg.   
Our data represents a panel data as it is multi-dimension involving observations of multiples companies 
with the same indicators studied over multiple time periods, permitting for observation of variations over 
time.  
Following the data collection, a data consolidation was completed by cross checking the numbers 
downloaded from Bloomberg and by adding figures to the missing values. Those were extracted from 
annual reports of the different companies of the sample.  
Furthermore, annual figures for our variable indicator representing innovation; R&D intensity; were 
calculated using the following formula:  




Turnover characterizes the total revenue in USD generated by a company during a year. R&D expenditures 
represent the amount of money in USD that a company allocates to research and development.  
After having calculated R&D intensity, we modelled the data in order to obtain the growth in R&D intensity 
in the time period preceding and succeeding the main M&A event for each company. This term represents 
the base year on which the company completed a merger or an acquisition.  For companies in our sample 
that took part in multiple mergers or acquisition between 2010 and 2013, we selected the year with the most 
significant acquisition in terms of deal value as base year for M&A event.  As an example, in our treatment 
group; Allergan took part in 3 different acquisitions in 2011, 2012 and 2013 for a transaction price of a $ 
400 mn; $4.4 bn and; $6.6 bn respectively. In that case, 2013 was taken as base year for our M&A event 
and is caled T0. This was the case for 4 companies in our sample. However, two of them had all of their 
acquisitions in the same year. 
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Following the data consolidation, descriptive analyses were performed for the innovation indicator variable; 
namely R&D intensity pre and post-merger. For every acquiring company in the sample, two years pre- (t-
2) and post-mergers (t+2) figures were analyzed.  For our descriptive statistics, it was of interest to analyze 
the variation of R&D intensity over the pre- and post- merger periods. To obtain those variations, we 
calculated R&D growth over the  pre- M&A event from t-2 to t0 and the post M&A event from t0 to t-2 by 
using the compound annual growth rate formula. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
 
Model and Estimation 
Statistical Tests 
In order to analyze the impact of a main M&A event on our innovation indicator: R&D intensity; we used 
a paired t- test to compare the growth of R&D intensity between the 2 year period preceding and following 
that event. Paired t- tests are used to compare two population means in two samples and where observations 
Label Unit Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N
Market cap t0 MC Million US Dollars 32,829.0         47,031.9                 32
Deal Value DV Million US Dollars 3,084.6           6,309.7                    32
R&D Intensity T-2 Percentage 0.17274          0.19383                  32
R&D intensity T0 RDI 0 Percentage 0.14261          0.11864                  32
R&D intensity T+2 Percentage 0.14951          0.11250                  32
R&D intensity growth T-2  T0 RDG0 Percentage (0.06282)        0.27888                  32
R&D  intensity growth T0 -T2 RDG2 Percentage 0.13699          0.44246                  32
Number of employees EMP Unit 26495.9 38426.2 32
Sales revenue Turnover TUR Million US Dollars 12147.7 17820.5 32
Sales revenue Turnover t+2 Million US Dollars 12577.3 18179.5 32
EBITDA T-2 Million US Dollars 3470.6 5670.5 32
EBITDA T0 EBI Million US Dollars 3666.7 5602.4 32
EBITDA Margin T-2 Percentage 0.08473 0.94197 32
EBITDA margin T0 EM Percentage 0.24310 0.14649 32
Dummy acquisition Nac Dummy 0.34375 0.48256 32
Tobin's Q t-2 unit 2.44068 2.77808 32
Tobin's Q T-0 TQ unit 1.94750 0.86399 32
Tobin's Q t+2 unit 2.13350 0.81270 32
TOT DEBT to Total Assets t-2 Percentage 0.19825 0.16575 32
TOT DEBT to Total Assets t0 TD/TA Percentage 0.24913 0.16588 32
TOT DEBT to Total Assets  t+2 Percentage 0.26871 0.15113 32
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in one sample can be paired with observations in another sample. In our case, we have a before and after 
observation on the same object: R&D intensity. 22 
The  null hypothesis of our t-test is that there is no significant difference between R&D intensity growth 
between the  2 years periods preceding and following the M&A event. Our alternative hypothesis is that 
R&D intensity growth increases between the 2 years periods preceding and following the M&A event. 
𝐻0: 𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−2−𝑡0 = 𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡0−𝑡+2 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−2−𝑡0 < 𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡0−𝑡+2 
In addition to a paired t-test, we tested the relationship between R&D intensity two year after the M&A 
event with different independent M&A and company specific variables through a regression analysis. 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 6 represents the correlation matrix for all the variables of interest meant for the model.  The negative 
correlation between Total Debt to Total Assets T0 and R&D intensity T+ 2 is consistent with previous 
findings of Hall (1990) stating that companies with low solvency ratio, which can indicate a high level of 
leverage are more likely to decrease their R&D intensity substantially. 23 
The correlation matrix itself is not sufficient to explain the causal relationship between the different 
variables as it does not take into account correlation of the different independent variables together with the 





                                                          
22 Shier, R. (2004). Paired t test. Retrieved from http://www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/paired-t-test.pdf 




Table 6: Correlation matrix of the different variables  
 
Regression analysis 
The aim of this section was to lay the ground work for Deloitte and understand which variables were of 
interest to analyze the effect of M&A on R&D intensity. To answer the following Research Question “ 
What statistical parameters can be used as indicators to measure innovation inside pharmaceutical 
companies? “,  we have set up a multiple linear regression. It will permit to understand which among the 
different independent variables described in the data section, are related to the dependent variable; R&D 
intensity. It will help Deloitte for the elaboration of the forthcoming model that will try to infer causal 
relationship between the M&A and innovation.  
We have set up a multilinear regression model trying to learn more about the relationship between R&D 
intensity at time T+2 and several independent variables that were selected based on their independent 
correlation coefficient with the dependent variable.  
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇+2 = 𝛼
′
0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑇0 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑇−2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇0 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝑇′𝑠𝑄𝑇0 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑇𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑇0+𝛽6 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇0 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇−2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   
The result of the regression  are presented on table 8 in the results section of this paper; allowing to 
determine the overall fit of the model and the relative contribution of each of the independent variables total 













































R&D Intensity T-2 1
R&D intensity T0 0.92 1
R&D intensity T+2 0.54 0.75 1
R&D intensity growth T-2  T0 -0.37 -0.05 0.27 1
R&D  intensity growth T0 -T2 -0.30 -0.25 0.26 0.13 1
Market cap t0 -0.12 -0.05 -0.08 0.10 -0.15 1
Number of employees t0 -0.17 -0.11 -0.15 0.15 -0.17 0.92 1
EBITDA Margin T-2 -0.04 -0.22 -0.60 -0.44 -0.32 0.18 0.17 1
EBITDA margin T0 -0.62 -0.57 -0.34 0.06 0.08 0.32 0.24 0.15 1
Dummy acquisition -0.26 -0.31 -0.25 -0.07 0.33 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.20 1
Tobin's Q t-2 -0.19 -0.25 -0.26 -0.22 -0.24 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.04 -0.10 1
Tobin's Q T-0 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.47 0.40 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.11 1
TOT DEBT to Total Assets t-2 -0.35 -0.41 -0.47 -0.16 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.22 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.29 1





This section discusses the empirical results regarding the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the 
innovation activity for the acquiring firms that took part in an M&A event during the sampled period. 
Table 7 shows the results of a paired t-test that compares the means for two variables, namely R&D intensity 
CAGR before and after the M&A event. According to the results of the paired t-test, R&D intensity CAGR 
for our sample has been decreasing on average by 5.93% in the two year period preceding the merger while 
it has been increasing by 13.16% on average in the two year period following the M&A event. The 
significance of the test refutes the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the R&D intensity 
growth for the time period preceding and following an M&A event.   
Table 7: Paired Sample t test for Means of R&D intensity growth rate 
 
Those results could be explained by the fact that pharmaceuticals firm with decreasing innovative output 
and no products or compounds coming through their pipeline, choose to acquire targets that are being very 
innovative in nature, with higher R&D intensity, in order to boost their innovative production.   
Table 8 illustrates the results of the paired sample t-test for mean for R&D intensity at time t-2 and t+2. As 
we can see, on average R&D intensity of an acquiring company decreases in the period following an 
acquisition. Those results are in line with a previous study by Schuz (2013) that observes a similar decline 
R&D intensity 
CAGR T-2 to T0
R&D intensity 









t Critical one-tail 1.69552
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.03914
t Critical two-tail 2.03951
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in R&D intensity of acquiring companies in the period following an acquisition.  However, our test fails to 
confirm this finding, as the p statistic of 0.21 does not allow to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference in R&D intensity between the 2 year timespan preceding and following a merger or 
an acquisition.  
Table 8: Paired Sample t test for Means of R&D intensity 
 
Regression 
Results of the modelled regression in equation 1 are illustrated on table 9. According to the p value of our 
F test, which is statistically significant at the 5% level, our model is better at explaining the variances than 
a restricted model. Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis that β1=0. In order to see if every variable 
uniquely predicts R&D intensity, looking at the correlation coefficient table can be useful. The adjusted R-
Square tells us that 78.6% of the variation in R&D intensity at time T+2 can be attributed to the 7 variables 
that were chosen as predictors.  
The independent variables of interest in the regression are certainly the 2 years period lag R&D intensity 
T0 and R&D intensity t-2 as they are both statistically significant. The negative regression coefficient of 
R&D intensity t-2 implies that there is a negative relationship between pre- and post- acquisition R&D 
intensity: higher R&D intensity prior to the M&A event is associated with lower R&D intensity after the 
completion of the deal.  This negative relationship could be explained by the fact that bigger firms with low 









t Critical one-tail 1.69552
P(T<=t) tw o-tail 0.42665
t Critical tw o-tail 2.03951
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R&D intensity, that need to develop or launch new innovative output, are more likely to acquire targets 
with a big focus on research and development and hence high R&D intensity ratio; ultimately leading to a 
higher R&D intensity in the period following the M&A event.  
The variable EBITDA Margin T-2 is statistically significant with a correlation coefficient of -0.04   Several 
variables as Tobin’s Q, Total debt to Total Assets and the number of employees were all statistically 
significant in the regression before the inclusion of R&D intensity T-2 an: d R&D intensity T0, but there 
explanatory power has been absorbed by the lag variable of R&D intensity The correlation coefficient of 
the variable number of employee t0 is 0 meaning that when taken with other variables such as R&D intensity 
T-2, the impact of emp disappears.  This indicates the need to include a control variable in the model in 
order to increase its accuracy and robustness.  The high standard error for both R&D intensity lag dependant 
variables can indicate the presence of multicollinearity in the model, affecting negatively its prediction.  










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 7 0.32742 0.04677 17.28822 0.00000
Residual 24 0.06493 0.00271
Total 31 0.39235
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.06672 0.03065 2.17671 0.03957
Number of employees t0 0.00000 0.00000 -1.48339 0.15099
EBITDA Margin T-2 -0.04472 0.01204 -3.71389 0.00108
EBITDA T0 0.00001 0.00001 1.15407 0.25984
Tobin's Q T-0 0.01444 0.01288 1.12052 0.27358
TOT DEBT to Total Assets t0 -0.00094 0.00068 -1.39153 0.17683
R&D Intensity T-2 -0.28994 0.14863 -1.95077 0.06285
R&D intensity T0 0.98535 0.25885 3.80657 0.00086
26 
 
In order to neutralise multicollinearity, R&D intensity T0 was removed from the model. As a result the 
standard error of the remaining independent variables of the model have decreased.  Furthermore, 
independent variables with insignificant p values and with regression coefficient close to 0 were also 
removed. Table 10 displays the results of the alternative multivariable linear regression used.  
Unsurprisingly, the adjusted R square has decreased and 63% of the variations of the dependant variable is 
now explained by the independent variables. The variable R&D intensity T-2 is still highly significant. 
Without the presence of the lagged variable R&D intensity T0, it is notable to see that the coefficient 
estimate of R&D intensity T-2 has changed of sign.   The significant coefficient estimate for EBITDA 
margin T-2 is negatively correlated with the explained variable and could be interpreted as a decrease in 
EBITDA margin at time T-2 would increase slightly R&D intensity at time T2.  
Table 10: Alternative regression results 
 
Conclusion 
This research was constrained by several limitations and the regression analysis were performed to lay out 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.2603 0.0868 18.3976 0.0000
Residual 28 0.1320 0.0047
Total 31 0.3923
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.134929             0.025861         5.217545       0.000015          
R&D Intensity T-2 0.264261             0.067908         3.891482       0.000562          
EBITDA Margin T-2 0.064987-             0.013442         4.834466-       0.000044          
TDTA T0 0.128955-             0.081390         1.584411-       0.124331          
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further investigation in a more elaborated model.  The results of the regression need to be analysed with 
care as no additional tests were performed to verify the linearity and normality assumptions. Furthermore, 
no causal relationship can be established at the moment as all the assumptions for causality were not met 
by the model.  
The results of the paired sample t test for means for R&D intensity suggests that there is no empirical 
evidence verifying that pharmaceutical M&A activity has reduced innovative output.  However, the results 
of the second paired sample t test suggest that R&D intensity growth decreases significantly prior to an 
M&A event before increasing substantially after it.  This effect was verified in the EU Industrial R&D 
investment scoreboard published by the European commission in 2016.  The results of our findings point 
towards similar conclusions as the established literature on the topic as we can’t explain any causal link 
between M&A and R&D intensity. 
This paper provides an opportunity for the employees of Deloitte to improve and enhance the scope of this 
study and answer to the research proposed by the European commission by suggesting the use of significant 
variables as Tobin’s Q, EBITDA margin and Total Debt to Total Assets as predictors to explain new 
pipeline progress indicator variables.  
To conclude, suggestions for further analyse would be to investigate the effect of the independent variables 
used in this model with the different pipeline progress indicators enumerated on Table 2 of the research. 
Furthermore, by increasing the sample size, further studies could separate the sample into different 
categories  based on their size, reason behind the M&A event ;and the type of M&A activity in which they 
were involved (e.g.: Asset transactions, acquisition , merger, etc...); to analyse the causal relationship 
between the different variables.  Likewise, the use of a Principal component Analysis (PCA) would be of 
interest in order to understand which of the predictor variables (i.e. innovation determinants) are truly 
important and need to be included in the final model. This type of analysis would allow to identify the 




Even though this research gives a contribution to Deloitte for further investigation, the following limitations 
should be recognized and discussed. The sample is limited to 32 publicly listed pharmaceutical company 
and therefore does not represent the entire spectrum of the industry. Furthermore, the scope of the research 
limited our access to payable database and restricted our access to databases on pipeline progress indicators 
such as patents. In turn, R&D intensity was used a unique innovation indicator limiting the scope of the 
study. 
Finally, the model does not account for time effect and the presence of dynamic relationship. This implies 
that a change in variable can have an impact on itself or other variables in one or future time periods. Indeed, 
M&A activity might not have an instantly effect on research intensity, it can be spread or distributed over 
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Case study 1: Novartis/GSK asset swap 
In 2014 Novartis and GSK went through a 3 way merger resulting in a swap of assets and pipeline products 
making both companies more focused in different markets. GSK acquired almost the full global human 
vaccine business of Novartis, excluding only their influenza departments, and a majority stake in a Joint 
Venture consisting of both GSKs and Novartis’ consumer health businesses. On the majority of the vaccine 
portfolio the European commission did not have major concerns except for the meningitis vaccine 
worldwide and the diphtheria/tetanus vaccines in Germany and Italy. This because for the meningitis 
vaccine market the only market players were Novartis (with Menveo) and GSK (with Mencevax and 
Nimenrix).  This meant that the merger would result in a de-facto monopoly situation. This has been solved 
by the worldwide divestment of the Mencevax and Nimenrix brands. In the diphtheria/tetanus vaccines the 
combined firm would have too much market power and they agreed with the commission that GSK should 
have a 10 year exclusive supply agreement with Germany and Italy. Regarding the oncology portfolio, 
consisting of 10 launched products and 2 pipeline products, the main problem was regarding the 
combination of B-Raf and MEK inhibitors in the pipeline. The merger would mean that there would only 
be 2 players left on the market owning both the B-Raf and MEK inhibitors, reducing the incentive for 
Novartis to continue development of these products. The commission judged this threat to be credible and 
that is why they had to transfer both pipeline products to Array biopharma.  
The reason that this case study is interesting from an innovation perspective has to do with the phase 2 
pipeline products of Novartis that had to be brought back to Array biopharma, it is a case in which the 
Commission explicitly focused on the phase 2 products in the pipeline and expressed worry of too little 
incentive to keep innovating. It will be interesting to find out whether the proposed measures have been 
enough to ensure no significant impediment on innovation in these markets. 
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Case study 2: M.2922-Pfizer/ Pharmacia 
In 2003 Pfizer acquired Pharmacia for 60 billion dollars, which made the combined entity the largest 
pharmaceutical firm in the world with an overall market share of 11% and 48 billion dollars in annual 
revenues. Pharmacia was engaged in R&D, production and sales of human pharmaceutical products, 
consumer health products, fine chemicals and animal healthcare. Consequently, the parties had horizontally 
overlapping activities in human pharmaceuticals, active substances and animal healthcare.  
The Merger was a way for Pfizer to fill its product pipeline. Indeed, through the merger Pfizer’s late-stage 
pipeline was boosted by pharmacia’s drugs including investigational compound eplerenone, parecoxib and 
CDP-870.24 Three markets in human pharmaceuticals were identified by the European commission where 
there were certain competition concerns. In order to eliminate these concerns both merging entities had to 
divest part of their assets.  
Concerning the market for C2A antihypertensive plain in the Netherlands, the merged entities would have 
made a big part of the market share  as both companies were already the market leaders in that country. The 
parties offered to stop selling Kentensin and transfer its rights and assets to a third party in order to avoid 
competition concerns.  
This case study is of interest as it involves a mega merger between two giants active in the pharmaceutical 
industry, where the main argument for the merge was to fill the pipeline of the bigger company and not 
necessarily to obtain synergies from the knowledge available in the smaller firm. The deal did require some 
divestment of assets and compounds as a result of competition concerns raised by the European 
commission.  
                                                          





Case study 3: Acquisition of Hospira by Pfizer 
In 2015, Pfizer acquired Hospira for 17 billion dollars. The acquired company, an American biomedical 
pharmaceutical company, specialized in injectable drugs and infusion technologies as well as being a global 
leader in biosimilar medicines. Pfizer’s motive behind the merger was to obtain the knowledge from 
Hospira and with it become the global leader in the sterile injectables drugs, biosmilars and infusion 
technology. Biosimilars are a lower cost alternative to biological medicines as they are approved by the 
FDA and have no significant clinical difference from their reference product. However, they are different 
from generics in the sense that they can never be exactly the same as the reference drug and are significantly 
more expensive to be produced. 
Infliximab, one of the bestselling medicine in the world, had a biosimilar co-marketed by Hospira in the 
EEA.  Pfizer was also developing a biosimilar of infliximab before the merger that was in the late stage of 
development. The European commission found it very plausible that the merger between the two companies 
would have led to a decrease in competition due to the cancellation of its own infliximab biosimilar 
development.  
 In order for the merger to be approved by the European Commission, Pfizer had to divest two of its 
activities. The approval was conditional to the divestment of some of Pfizer sterile injectable drugs and one 
of its compound in the development stage, the infliximab biosimilar drug.  
In this case it will be interesting to see whether the merger provided Pfizer with enough knowledge to gain 
synergies in its pipeline and innovate their way to become the global leader in the sterile injectable drugs, 
biosmilars and infusion technology. Additionally, Pfizer had to divest its late stage infliximab biosimilar, 
it will be interesting what effect that had on other players in the competitive environment and whether it 





Case study 4: Sanofi Aventis –Genzyme merger  
In 2011, Sanofi-Aventis proceeded to the acquisition of the US biotechnology firm: Genzyme Corporation. 
The combination of both companies contributed to Sanofi- Aventis’ growth strategy by expanding its 
presence in biotechnology. The acquisition gave Sanofi access to Genzyme’s capabilities in treating renal 
endocrinology, Hematology-Oncology and Biosurgery business that are complementary to Sanofi-aventis 
existing business. After this deal Sanofi’s entire oncology research department was moved to the research 
center in Cambridge. The deal was worth 20 billion dollars plus an additional contingent value right (CVR) 
for Genzyme’s old shareholders. 
This case is of interest, as suspicions exist that Sanofi Aventis, on purpose, did not invest enough resources  
and delayed the FDA approval of  Genzyme’s late stage compound fighting multiple sclerosis drug: 
Lematrada. The CVR agreement was based on Lematrada gaining FDA approval as well reaching future 
sales volume. Genzyme’s former shareholders filed a claim suing Sanofi for delaying the development and 
promotion of Lematrada in order to avoid paying CVR rights.  Investors claimed that Sanofi preferred to 
develop and promote Aubagio, Sanofi’s in house developed multiple sclerosis drug and made no diligent 
efforts to achieve the different milestones set in the CVR agreement.   
Hence, it will be interesting to see whether the financial structure of the deal put a break on innovation or 
whether the effect was only minor. Additionally the moving of its entire cancer research into Genzyme’s 
research center in Cambridge could have had a positive impact (through synergies) and a negative impact 
(due to the impact on the continuation of research) on innovation. It will be interesting to explore this.  
 
